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ILLINOIS PUBLIC UTILITY LAW AND THE
CONSUMER: A PROPOSAL TO REDRESS THE
IMBALANCE
Ellis B. Levin*
The procedural, substantive, and institutional factors in-
volved in a utility request for a rate increase generally assure
that the request will be granted. Traditionally, the vast finan-
cial and political resources of the utilities, coupled with general
consumer apathy, has resulted in the creation of rate proceed-
ings favorable to utility interests. The author offers various pro-
posals that he believes will eliminate most of the imbalance.
Though utility consumers have become increasingly involved in
rate proceedings in recent years, the author concludes that final
resolution of the problem remains with the Illinois legislature.
I. INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, public utility regulation was beyond the compre-
hension and concern of the average consumer. It was a preserve
of the expert. Public exposure was limited to brief announce-
ments in the news media that the telephone, gas, or electric com-
pany had filed for a rate increase. Months later, a follow-up an-
nouncement would indicate that the utility had obtained all or
most of the increase it had requested. Rarely, outside of Califor-
nia,' did a consumer seek to involve himself in the process.
Today, public utility regulation is highly visible. At every stage
of the process the news media reports the statements of the util-
ity's witnesses, the counterstatements of the utility's critics, and
occasionally, undertakes an independent analysis of the merits.
Individual consumers, civic organizations, labor unions, and poli-
ticians have begun to involve themselves in the hearings. A mea-
sure of the dramatic increase in public involvement in public
* Illinois State Representative; Associate, Pressman & Hartunian; B.A., University of
Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University.
1. The California Public Utilities Commission enjoys a reputation for being the most
activist commission in the country. Part of the explanation for this may be the tradition-
ally high level of citizen participation in public utility regulatory proceedings. For exam-
ple, in In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 P.U.R.3d 513 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1964), there
were over 75 intervenors representing other utilities, private businesses, governmental
jurisdictions, citizen organizations and private individuals.
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utility regulation is suggested by the number of intervenors in the
1951 and 1972 Illinois Bell Telephone rate hearings. In 1951, five
municipalities, the Attorney General of Illinois, the State's Attor-
ney of Cook County, the Greater Chicago Hotel Association, and
one ad hoc consumer group intervened in rate hearings.' In con-
trast, in 1972, 14 municipalities, the State of Illinois, the United
States government, one labor union, six citizens' organizations,
eight businesses, and four individual citizens intervened.'
A newcomer to public utility regulation finds a field of law long
dominated by the regulated. Like landlord and tenant law, public
utility law in Illinois is best characterized by its lack of symme-
try. While it should theoretically protect both the utility and the
consumer, the law, both procedurally and substantively, is de-
signed to provide maximum protection to the utility's interests.
Commensurate protection is not afforded the consumers.
This Article will delineate the basic procedural, substantive,
and institutional factors involved in rate proceedings before the
Illinois Commerce Commission. An attempt will be made to indi-
cate how these factors have consistently contributed to producing
higher rates for Illinois utility consumers. Also, the role of the
utility consumer in rate proceedings will be explored. While this
Article deals primarily with the Illinois Bell Telephone Company,
the principles expressed apply generally to all utilities and in no
way limit the proposals offered.
II. PROCEDURAL FACTORS
The general procedure for considering a rate increase appears
neutral on its face. The utility files proposed rates with the Illi-
nois Commerce Commission to increase revenues. The Commis-
sion holds public hearings on the request and renders a decision
based on the evidence.4 An examination of the specific procedural
2. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R. 167, 168 n.5 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1951).
3. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 56831 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1972). A major reason
for the consumers' new found involvement is the ever accelerating round of public utility
rate increase filings that are the result of inflation. See Comment, Representation of the
Public Interest in Michigan Utility Rate Proceedings, 70 MICH. L. Rv. 1367 (1972);
Lander, Public Utility Rate Design: The Cost of Service Method of Pricing, 19 ST. Louis
L.J. 36 (1974).
4. The typical analysis employed by a state utility commission in determining whether
the utility is entitled to an increase is as follows: first, it determines the dollar value of
the utility's assets devoted to providing utility service in the state; second, it determines
a reasonable rate of profit for the utility; third, it computes the actual profit to which the
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aspects of Illinois public utility law, however, will reveal that it
is anything but unbiased.
A. Increases Without Formal Hearings and Commission
Findings
In Illinois, once a utility has filed a proposed rate increase or a
change in regulations that has the effect of increasing rates, the
state regulatory commission has two options. It can suspend the
rate proposal and hold formal hearings, or it can allow the pro-
posal to go into effect without any hearings at all.5 If the Commis-
sion decides to hold formal hearings, it must give the utility and
other interested parties a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence.' Thereafter, the Commission must render a decision based
on substantial evidence within eleven months from the date the
proposal was filed, or the proposal automatically goes into
effect.! While such an automatic rate increase remains subject to
permanent cancellation by the Commission's final order, the
order will not affect revenues already collected.' In making the
determination whether to suspend the proposed increase and hold
hearings, the Commission is not required to follow any particular
procedure.9 Furthermore, the decision whether to hold hearings is
utility is entitled by multiplying the dollar value of the utility's assets by the rate of profit;
fourth, it subtracts operating revenue from operating expenses for a 12 month period; fifth,
it compares the balance with the computed profit figure, and if the latter is greater,
calculates the amount of increase necessary to offset the difference. The utility is then
entitled to institute rates that will produce the rate of return approved by the Commission.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §36 (1975).
6. With the exception of those parties that have a statutory right to participate in rate
proceedings, the statutes are unclear as to who may otherwise intervene. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §§68-69 (1975).
7. City of Edwardsville v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 310 Ill. 618, 142 N.E. 197 (1924). See
also Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith, 295 F. Supp. 385, 387 (S.D. Ill. 1923).
8. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 5 ll.2d 195, 125 N.E.2d
269 (1965).
9. Antioch Milling Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 4 Ill.2d 200, 123 N.E.2d 302 (1955). In Anti-
och, public grist mill operators compalined that a rate schedule proposed by an electric
power company was unreasonable and discriminatory. The operators also contended that
the Commerce Commission had permitted new rates to go into effect without first finding
such increase was necessary. The court held that the Public Utilities Act granted the
Commission the authority to either suspend the new rate pending a formal hearing re-
garding its propriety or allow the rate to go into effect without a formal hearing. The court
further determined that, in passing upon any proposed rate change, the Commission
could exercise its discretion regarding what methods to employ. Any preliminary hearing
19771
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not reviewable, regardless of the size of the increase. 0
California offers the only significant departure from this pat-
tern. Under the state constitution," rate decreases proposed by a
utility may be put into effect without formal hearings or commis-
sion findings. However, increases in utility rates must be based
on substantial evidence and formal findings after full hearings,
the burden being on the utility to establish that the proposed
rates are fair and reasonable. Prior to the 1921 amendments to the
Public Utilities Act, a similar procedure was in effect in Illinois."
In order to protect the consumer from unwarranted rate increases,
Illinois should return to this long abandoned procedure.
B. Period of Repose
While the Illinois Commerce Commission enjoys discretionary
authority to permit a rate increase to go into effect without full
hearings and formal findings, there is no discretion to deny, with-
out hearings, new filings by a utility. The hearing requirement
applies even to filings for rate increases that closely follow a prior
Commission decision on the same question. 3 There also is no
required period of repose during which a utility is barred from
filing for further rate increases." Consequently, nothing prevents
a utility that failed to receive a proposed rate increase from re-
conducted by the Commission to gauge the views of interested parties was not required
to conform to statutory standards for complaint proceedings.
10. Id.
11. CAL. CONST. art. 12, §20. See also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §454 (1961).
12. The 1921 Act eliminated the following language from Section 36 of the Public
Utilities Act:
No public utility shall increase any rate or other charge or so alter any classifi-
cation . . . as to result in any increase . . . except upon a showing before the
Commission and a finding by the Commission that such increase is justified.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lila, §36 (1914). For an interpretation of this language, see Michel v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 226 Ill.App. 50 (2d Dist. 1922).
13. There is, however, sound precedent for finding the existence of such discretion
vested in the Commission. This view is based upon the last lines of section 67 of the Public
Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §71 (1975) which states:
Only one rehearing shall be granted by the Commission, but this shall not be
construed to prevent any party from filing a petition setting up a new and
different state of facts after 2 years, and invoking the action of the Commission
thereon.
See In re Peoria White Star Bus Co., 2 I.C.C.R. 115 (1923) (Commission relied upon this
language to deny a rate increase).
14. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Ill. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329
(1953).
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peatedly filing identical proposals until the Commission finally
capitulates and grants the increase. Further, nothing prevents a
utility that has recently obtained a substantial rate increase from
immediately filing for a further increase.
Some utilities traditionally have made repeated filings in Illi-
nois. For example, after Illinois Bell received a rate of return in
excess of 9.13 per cent in November 1970,'1 which was the highest
rate allowed a major telephone company at that time, Bell filed
for an even greater increase the following September. When the
Commission granted Bell only an 8.00 per cent effective rate of
return,'" Bell refiled rate increase requests five times within the
next five months-requests that sought a rate of return above 9.13
per cent. In December 1973, Bell was granted over sixty-five per
cent of the cumulative requests." Seeking a still higher rate of
return, in March 1974, Bell filed for a formula that would allow
monthly rate increases. In February 1975, one week after that
request was denied,'" Illinois Bell requested still another rate in-
crease."6
Unlike Illinois, the State of Washington has a statutory period
of repose. When a new filing for an increase is made within two
years of the determination of a prior rate proposal, the
Washington Commerce Commission has the discretion to dismiss
the filing summarily without holding hearings. 0 Such a provision
allows some finality to a Commission order denying an increase.
It prevents the utility from coming back the very next day to
request another increase. Moreover, the repose period permits
sufficient time to elapse in order to assess the consequences of a
rate increase.
Illinois should adopt a period of repose, possibly eighteen
months, during which utilities could not file rate proposals either
identical or similar to those previously filed. In this way, some
degree of finality would be afforded Commission orders and utili-
ties would be precluded from filing rate increases at their whim.
15. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 65 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1970).
16. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 56831 (Il. Commerce Comm'n 1973).
17. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 57903-6 & 58033 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1973).
18. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 58916 (I1. Commerce Comm'n 1975).
19. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 59666 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
20. WASH. REV. CODE §80.04.200 (1975). The provision is limited, however, to six months
if the utility does not appeal from the Commission's determination.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
C. Temporary Rate Changes
Procedures for temporary rate changes, whether upward or
downward, represent another area in which Illinois public utility
law favors the utilities. Basically, the procedures are designed to
favor rate increases rather than decreases. For example, if a pro-
posed rate increase is suspended by the Commission pending for-
mal hearings and a final order, the utility still may seek a tempo-
rary increase during the pendency of the Commission proceed-
ing." The decision whether to grant the temporary increase need
not be based upon a full hearing, or even the 30-day notice nor-
mally required before a rate change is permitted to go into effect.
The criteria is simply "good cause shown."2 No other more ex-
plicit criteria exists to limit the circumstances under which the
authority may be exercised. Also, no criteria exists to limit the
amount of the temporary increase or the length of time that the
increase may remain in effect. The judicial justification for this
liberal standard of review is that any excessive increase may be
rectified by the Commission in its final order. Erroneous or even
clearly illegal determinations in a temporary order are not subject
to review until after the Commission's final order.23 On the other
hand, if the Commission refuses to grant a temporary rate in-
crease, that order is subject to judicial review to determine
whether it creates a confiscatory rate situation for the utility.24
In contrast to its nearly unlimited authority to increase rates
temporarily, the Commission's authority to decrease rates tempo-
rarily is subject to very clear statutory limitations. The Commis-
sion must determine that (1) the net income of the utility is in
excess of the amount required to provide a reasonable return on
the value of the utility's property, (2) the final determination of
the case will require more than 120 days, and (3) the amount of
the reduction will not prevent the utility from earning a reasona-
ble rate of return. 5 Additionally, such a reduction is limited to a
nine-month period which the Commission can extend to twelve
21. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E.2d 482 (1940).
22. Chicago Rys. v. City of Chicago, 292 Il1. 190, 202, 126 N.E. 585, 590 (1920).
23. Hoyne v. Chicago & Oak Park Elevated Ry., 294 Ill. 413, 128 N.E. 587 (1920).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §36 (1975). See also Note, Use of the Refund Device in
Rate Regulation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1024 n.9 (1950).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §36 (1975).
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months." If the final order provides for a higher rate of return
than the temporary order, the utility is entitled to a temporary
increase to compensate it for the amount lost during the period
in which the temporary reduction was in effect. Temporary rate
reductions also are subject to judicial review to determine if they
are confiscatory."8
D. Discovery
The actions of public utilities cannot be countered successfully
without adequate information. Just as a public utility enjoys a
monopoly with respect to providing utility service, it exercises
exclusive control over documents, information, and witnesses
familiar with its operations to a degree which utility consumers
cannot share. For this reason, discovery procedures are needed if
consumers are to participate effectively in rate proceedings. Un-
fortunately, the Illinois Commerce Commission does not recog-
nize a statutory right to discovery by consumer intervenors.'
With the Commission asserting that no statutory right to dis-
covery exists, the ability of the consumer intervenor to obtain
discovery is dependent on the whim of the hearing officer and
Commission. This may be a major obstacle to discovery. For ex-
ample, in In re Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,30 the hearing officer
allowed extensive intervenor discovery with respect to Illinois
Bell's advertising and public relations, which later formed the
basis for the Commission's finding that forty per cent of the
26. Id.
27. Prior to 1933, the Commission had no authority to order temporary rate reductions.
Sharon, The Illinois Commerce Commission, 1949 U.ILL.L.F. 192, 213 (1949). For an
analysis of section 36, see Barns, Temporary Rates in Utility Regulation, 1940 U. ILL. L.F.
929, 950-51 (1940).
28. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Perring, 351 Ill.App. 195, 114 N.E.2d 468 (2d
Dist. 1953); Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923). The rather detailed
and restrictive language of section 36 with respect to temporary rate reductions was an
attempt to avoid the substantive due process attack of the Prendergast case.
29. In In re Illinois Bell. Tel. Co., No. 59666, 3-4 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1976) the
Commission stated:
The Commission is of the opinion that the rules relating to discovery con-
tained in the Civil Practice Act need not be precisely followed during adminis-
trative hearings pending before this Commission. Nonetheless, the Commission
has the power to require a public utility under its jurisdiction to furnish such
information as may reasonably be required for the determination of issues pend-
ing during a proceeding.
30. Nos. 57903-6, 58033 (Il1. Commerce Comm'n 1973).
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utility's advertising and public relations expenditures were
improper. By contrast, in the Illinois Bell rate case completed in
February 1976,1' the hearing officer refused discovery demands for
identical data on advertising and public relations provided in the
earlier rate case. The result was that the Commission found all
but a token amount of Illinois Bell's advertising to be proper. 2
States like California recognize the right to discovery in adminis-
trative proceedings as necessitated by the modern requirements
of due process and a fair hearing."
A second procedural obstacle to consumer discovery in public
utility rate proceedings is the refusal of the Commission, on sev-
eral occasions, to rule on appeals from a hearing officer's denial
of discovery until the day before the record in the case was to
close.34 This delay severely limited the value of the discovery
granted. In contrast, where consumer discovery was permitted by
the hearing officer, the Commission has acted with great dispatch
on utility appeals for protective orders. 35 This practice reflects the
Commission's pro-utility bias.
For discovery purposes in hearings before the Illinois Com-
merce Commission, Illinois should adopt the procedures of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act. This would grant the consumer inter-
venor a statutory right to discovery and increase the effective
level of consumer participation.
31. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 59666 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
32. Id. at 23.
33. Shively v. Steward, 65 Cal.2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1966). The
principle of pre-trial discovery in administrative proceedings has received broad approval
in recent years. Grog House, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 12 Ore.App.426,
432, 507 P.2d 419, 422 (1973); Viculin v. Department of Civil Serv., 386 Mich. 375, 401,
192 N.W.2d 449, 463 (1971). See also Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 89
DUKE L.J. (1971).
34. See, e.g., In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 57903-6 & 58033 (Il1. Commerce Comm'n
1973), where the Commission delayed six months in ruling on the Independent Voters of
Illinois' motion to compel answers to interrogatories, and finally denied clearly relevant
discovery a few days before the expiration of the statutory 11 month period the Commis-
sion has to consider rate filings. The Commission also has waited to rule on an appeal of
a denial of discovery until after the final order in the case was rendered. In re Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., No. 59666 (Il1. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
35. Another procedural obstacle to a fair hearing for the utility consumer occurred in
In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 57903-6 & 58033 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1973) (where
Commission staff, who had testified as advocates of particular positions on contested
issues, engaged in in camera discussions with commissioners regarding the proceedings
both before and after the record was closed).
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E. Choice of Judicial Forum for Review
Each intervenor and the utility are entitled to judicial review
of an unfavorable Commission order. Section 68 of the Illinois
Public Utilities Act" permits appeals "to the Circuit Court of the
county in which the subject matter of the hearing is situated, or
if the subject matter of the hearing is situated in more than one
county, then to any one of such counties. . . ."" Despite the
fact that Illinois Bell operates in approximately two-thirds of the
102 counties in Illinois" and that the bulk of its subscribers reside
in Cook County, Illinois, Bell has never appealed a Commission
order to the Circuit Court of Cook County.3" Although the Com-
mission hearings generally are held in Chicago, Illinois Bell pre-
fers to appeal unfavorable orders to the Circuit Court of Kane
County, a more conservative, pro-business area of the state.9 In
December 1970, Illinois Bell appealed a rather favorable Commis-
sion decision4 to the Circuit Court of Du Page County, another
somewhat conservative area, in order to prevent any effective
appeal by the intervenors, who were required to file in the court
where the first appeal was filed.' 2 Likewise, in January 1974, Illi-
nois Bell appealed to the Circuit Court of Winnebago County for
the same reason. 3 In both cases, they were able effectively to kill
the appeals as a result of this tactic.
An additional difficulty created by the present statute is that
the appeal is made to courts that rarely hear a public utility case
and, as a result, are often without any expertise in public utility
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §72 (1975).
37. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1331 et seq. (1934),
prohibiting such appeals, a direct appeal of the Commission determination could be
brought by a utility in federal court. See 10 J. LAND & PuB. UTIL. ECON. 313 (1934).
38. This fact was determined from viewing a map of the telephone franchises in Illinois
published by the Illinois Commerce Commission on file in its Chicago office.
39. The author, in his research in this area, has been unable to find one instance where
Illinois Bell has appealed an adverse Commission order to a circuit court of Cook County.
40. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill.2d 461, 303
N.E.2d 364 (1973); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Il1. 275, 111
N.E.2d 329 (1953).
41. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 65 (IIl. Commerce Comm'n 1970).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §72 (1971). See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 414 I1. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1953).
43. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 74-383 (Cir. Ct. of Winne-
bago County 1974). Illinois Bell's appeal departs from that policy in Illinois Bell Tel. Co.
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. - (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County 1976).
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law. The reason the utilities appeal to these courts is obvious:
being unfamiliar with the complexity of utility regulation, these
courts are more likely to be persuaded by the arguments of the
utilities' experts.
Many states do not allow such forum shopping.44 In order to
avoid this problem, most states require that an appeal be taken
to specified county circuit courts, frequently the county where the
state capital is located, 5 or else directly to the state supreme
court." Another approach is found in Oregon, which permits ap-
peals to the circuit court for the county where the state capital
is located, to the circuit court for the county in which any hearing
has been held in the proceeding, or to the circuit court for the
county in which the principal office of the utility is located.47 In
the interests of justice and fairness to utility consumers, Illinois
should eliminate this forum shopping problem by allowing ap-
peals only to the circuit court of the county in which the largest
number of its customers reside.
F. No Restitution if Commission Order Granting Rate Increase
is Reversed
Should the consumer succeed in having a rate increase order
reversed, under Illinois law he cannot expect restitution for that
portion of the rate increase found to be excessive. The utility is
allowed to keep the proceeds from the rate increase. Any relief the
consumer receives is prospective only,"8 supposedly in the form of
lower future rates. However, by filing for a continuous series of
rate increases, the utility can eliminate even that relief. For
example, in In re Illinois Bell Telephone Co.," the Commission
granted Bell approximately sixty-five per cent of its total request
in December 1973. The Independent Voters of Illinois and other
44. Among those which do are Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §91 (1969); and
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §54-203 (Bums 1965).
45. This was the practice in Illinois prior to 1921. See ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 111a, §68
(1916).
46. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §234 (1970); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 49, §4903-12
(Baldwin 1971).
47. ORE. REV. STAT. §§756, 580(2) (1971).
48. Utility Users League v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 43 P.U.R.3d 38 (Ill. 1961); Mandel
Bros. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 2 IIl.2d 205, 117 N.E.2d 774 (1954). See also Note,
33 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 110 (1955).
49. No. 57903-6 & 58033 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1973).
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intervenors appealed from that order to the Circuit Court of Win-
nebago County. That appeal is still pending. However, in March
1975, Illinois Bell filed for a new rate increase that was only
partially granted." If the 1973 appeal by the IVI were to succeed
today, Illinois consumers, under the existing interpretation of
Illinois law, would not be entitled to a rebate. Also, because a new
order is now in effect, future rates would not be affected by the
decision. The consumer's victory would be purely academic. Con-
sequently, utilities are able to protect themselves from adverse
reviews of rate increases by filing for future increases.51
While the consumer receives no direct financial benefit from a
successful appeal, the same cannot be said for an appeal by a
utility. A utility can achieve significant financial benefit from
winning an appeal of a Commission order that either lowered its
rates or failed to increase them sufficiently. Under section 68 of
the Illinois Public Utilities Act, 2 a reviewing court is authorized
to stay or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of a Commis-
sion order pending appeal, upon the posting of bond. A utility is
financially capable of posting such bond, and on occasion that
device has been used." In contrast, a consumer intervenor is
usually neither financially capable nor strongly motivated to post
bond. If the utility subsequently wins the appeal, it retains those
rates it was permitted to charge in excess of those authorized by
the Commission. Even if the utility loses the appeal, the failure
of all potential claimants to apply for refunds may leave the
utility ahead. For example, in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Slattery,54 the utility lost an appeal that lasted seventeen years,
but was permitted to claim $1.7 million in both unclaimed princi-
pal and interest from refunds. Upholding the company's claim to
the undistributed portion of the refund gives utilities an added
incentive to oppose rate reductions and to prolong the litigation
which follows an unfavorable Commission order. 5
50. No. 59666 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
51. Further, the exclusive nature of the Illinois Public Utilities Act serves as a bar to
consumer rebates where the utility falls into a windfall situation. Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 207 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (attorney general
denied right to intervene on behalf of utility customers in utility anti-trust action against
electrical equipment manufacturer for price fixing).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. i11, §68 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939).
54. Id.
55. See Barns, Temporary Rates in Utilities Regulation, 1940 U. ILL. L.F. 929, 933
19771
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An Illinois law should be adopted authorizing the Commission
to set temporary rates following the completion of an appeal. This
rate could reflect either the amount of underpayment or overpay-
ment of utility rates made during the pendency of an appeal
seeking to reverse a Commission rate order. As a result, utilities
will receive only those revenues to which they are entitled.
G. Remand Following Reversal
Even if the consumer successfully appeals from a Commission
rate increase, and obtains a reversal before new rates are promul-
gated, the Illinois utility customer still may never see any rebate
of the illegally collected rates in the form of lower future rates.
This is because of the reluctance of the Commission to rule upon
the remand.
In the 1973 decision of Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Commission,5 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
and remanded a Commission order allowing a rate increase. How-
ever, it was not until March 1975 that the Commission finally
held hearings pursuant to the remand. As of December 1976, the
date of this writing, a series of Commission hearings on the re-
mand have been scheduled that either have been cancelled with-
out notice or held with no evidence being taken. Thus, more than
three years after the supreme court decision, no consumer rebates
have been forthcoming.
The California courts have held that rebates should follow di-
rectly from the judicial reversal without protracted remand pro-
ceedings before the Public Utilities Commission." Unfortunately,
it is almost impossible effectively to order a speedy disposition of
a remand by the Commission. The only solution is either to adopt
a procedure similar to that of California or to change the member-
ship of the Commission.
(1940); Simpson, Two Recent Utility Cases Involving Refunds, 15 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL.
ECON. 238 (1963); Note, Use of the Refund Device in Rate Regulation, 63 HARV. L. REv.
1024 (1950).
56. 55 Ill. 461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973).
57. City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 7 Cal.3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 313 (1972). The Ohio courts have reached the opposite and rather ridiculous conclu-
sion that after an order is reversed by the courts, the public utilities commission may take
as long as it wants to promulgate new rates; amounts collected under the illegal rate after
the court decision are not subject to rebate. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 46 Ohio 2d 105, 346 N.E.2d 778 (1976).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS
In addition to the many procedural factors in the rate-making
process that work to the disadvantage of utility consumers, there
are similar substantive factors as well. Typically, these substan-
tive factors relate to the criteria that the Commission may con-
sider when evaluating a proposed rate increase.
A. Reproduction Cost
One of the most unfavorable substantive factors facing Illinois
utility consumers is the judicially imposed requirement that the
Commission consider reproduction cost when establishing a util-
ity's profit level. Reproduction cost is the valuation placed on a
utility's assets and involves valuing the assets at their cost of
replacement. Use of reproduction cost during inflationary periods
effectively provides the utility with a "windfall" by causing the
calculation of earnings to be based on figures in excess of amounts
actually invested. Thus, the utility may make a profit solely be-
cause of inflation. Such a procedure is not followed in private
industry58 and eventually translates into higher rates for utility
consumers."
Because of the extensive efforts necessary to determine repro-
duction cost valuations, the reproduction cost method has the ad-
ditional disadvantage of being expensive. The utility consumer
eventually will pay for the expenses incurred in administering the
reproduction cost method, because expenses incurred in connec-
tion with rate proceedings are considered legitimate operating
expenses. 0 Another disadvantage of using the reproduction cost
method is that it diverts Commission staff time from other areas,
and its highly complex and technical character discourages con-
sumers from becoming involved in the hearing process. Further,
in requiring the consideration of reproduction cost, Illinois is in
the minority. Currently, less than one-third of the states use the
58. For a critical discussion of reproduction costs, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY USE (1st ed. 1932).
59. An analysis of comparative profits of utilities in reproduction cost and original cost
jurisdictions can be found in In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 56831 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1972) (Administrative record, testimony of Dr. John K. Largum).
60. See Du Page Util. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 47 Ill.2d 550, 267 N.E.2d 662
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971).
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reproduction cost method." Prior to 1943, almost every state uti-
lized the method because of the substantive due process mandate
of the United States Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames.62 That
mandate was reversed in Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas Co.,63 wherein the Supreme Court held that due
process did not require the use of any particular method of valua-
tion. After Hope Natural Gas, most state courts moved to statu-
tory interpretations of their state utilities laws to determine
whether a commission should consider reproduction cost when
determining rate base value."
The Illinois Supreme Court faced this issue in Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,65 and steadfastly
refused to depart from its practice of considering reproduction
cost. With the exception of Illinois," every state court faced with
interpreting the word "value," either in the valuation section or
the temporary rate reduction section of its public utilities act, has
interpreted the language as not requiring consideration of repro-
duction cost. 7 In some states the legislature has acted to elimi-
nate any consideration of reproduction cost that may have been
suggested by statute. 68
61. See Hunt & Legg, Public Utility Rates in Illinois: The Bell Cases, 50 Nw. U.L. REV.
17 (1955). See also A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 139-67 (1969).
62. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
63. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
64. Hunt & Legg, supra note 61, at 21-23.
65. 414 Il1. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1953).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §30 (1975) reads as follows: "The commission shall have
power to ascertain the value of the property of every public utility in this state and every
fact which in its judgment may or does have any bearing on such value..." (emphasis
added). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §36 (1975) states that the commission may enter a
temporary rate reduction order whenever utility income "is in excess of the amount re-
quired for a reasonable return upon the value of said public utility's property used and
useful in rendering its service to the public .... "
67. Hunt & Legg, supra note 61, at 22 n.13. An updating of the Hunt and Legg survey
reveals that, with the exception of Illinois, the same uniformity of interpretation continues
in state court decisions involving the word "value," whether modified or not. See, e.g.,
City of Fort Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474 (1952); Ohio
& Colo. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 68 Colo. 137, 187 P.2d 1082
(1970); State v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 30 N.J. 16, 29, 152 A.2d 35, 42 (1959); South-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 204 Okla. 225, 230 P.2d 260, 265-66 (1951); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944); Milwaukee &
Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 13 Wisc.2d 384, 391, 108 N.W.2d 729,
733 (1961). See also Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938).
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 48, §52 (1971) ("reasonable value of a public utility's
property shall be deemed to be the original cost thereof. ... ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
Although neither the courts or legislature has required a
change, two years ago the Illinois Commerce Commisson an-
nounced that henceforth it will not use reproduction cost in rate
cases." Whether the Illinois Supreme Court will uphold this
change in practice is unclear. Abandoning reproduction cost will
require the rejection of seventy years of precedent. 0
B. Operating Expenses
A second substantive factor working to the disadvantage of the
Illinois utility consumer is operating expenses that are reflected
in utility rates. Some operating expenses are highly visible to the
public and are the source of public irritation. These include util-
ity advertising, public relations, charitable contributions made to
favored charities of the utility's officers, lobbying expenses, and
political contributions." Other operating expenses, such as those
categorized as services from Illinois Bell's parent, AT&T, or
equipment, purchased from Illinois Bell's affiliate, Western
Electric, are less visible, but are even more costly." Extravagant
expenditures by the utility can mean higher rates to the con-
sumer. However, with few exceptions, the Illinois Commerce
Commission has no authority to prohibit wasteful expenditures.
Section 8 of the Public Utilities Act declares that:
The Commission shall have general supervision of all public
utilities except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall inquire
into the management of the business thereof and shall keep
itself informed as to the manner and methods in which the
business is conducted. . . .,
35, §52 (1964) (forbids "current value" from being considered); MINN. STAT. ANN. §237.08
(West 1972) ("prudent acquisition cost ... current value. . . ."); N.D. CENT. CODE §49-
06-02 (1960) (". . . shall be the money honestly and prudently invested therein ...").
69. In re Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 57300, 11-17 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1973).
70. City of Alton v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 26 P.U.R.3d 187, 192 (Il1. Commerce
Comm'n 1958). See also Du Page Util. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 47 Ill.2d 550,
267 N.E.2d 662 (1971). See City of Alton v. Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill.2d 76, 81-82, 165
N.E.2d 513, 516-17 (1960). But see Killarney Water Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
37 Ill.2d 345, 226 N.E.2d 858 (1967).
71. See Comment, Representation of the Public Interest in Michigan Utility Rate
Proceedings, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1367 (1972).
72. The documents acquired in connection with In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 59666
(Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1975) indicate in 1975 Illinois Bell paid close to $25 million to
its parent, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., for management, ownership and other
"services." In 1974, it paid almost $2.7 million to Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of AT&T for Business Information Systems and over $275 million
to Western Electric Co., another Bell affiliate, for equipment and supplies.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §8 (1975).
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The Illinois Supreme Court has found this delegation of authority
to be an insufficient basis for the Commission to prohibit an
unnecessary expenditure."4 The court found that an express dele-
gation of authority was necessary for the Commission to exercise
such power. 5 Beyond this a constitutional impediment might also
exist with respect to interstate transactions."
The inability of the Illinois Commerce Commission to control
public utilities' operating expenditures leaves open the possibility
for massive exploitation of the consumer.77 The Illinois General
Assembly has dealt with this problem, but only with regard to a
few, specific management functions.7" Many important areas
remain untouched.7 Even in those areas where the General As-
sembly clearly has delegated authority to the Commission to con-
trol utility expenditures, the Commission has failed to do so. 0
74. Illinois Commerce Comm'n ex rel. East St. Louis, C. & W. Ry. v. East St. Louis
C. & W. Ry., 361 Il. 606, 198 N.E. 716 (1935).
75. Id. at 614, 198 N.E. at 720. The court did not deal with §8(a) of the Public Utilities
Act, enacted in 1933 and requiring all contracts with affiliates "hereafter made" to be
approved by the Commission before going into effect. The contract in question had been
entered into in 1913.
Such a narrow reading of Commission authority to control utility actions with respect
to operating expenses contrasts sharply with its wide authority to control utility actions
that directly affect utility customers, such as improvements of passenger facilities. See
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n ex rel. Illinois Central R.R., 18
Ill.2d 322, 163 N.E.2d 822 (1960) (consumer safety); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Chi-
cago Rys., 362 Ill. 559, 1 N.E.2d 65 (1936). See also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 34 Cal.2d 822, 215 P.2d 441 (1950). See Note, "Management Invaded"-A Real
or False Defense?, 5 STAN. L. REv. 110 (1952).
76. State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 567 (1934).
77. Comment, The Servicing Function of Public Utility Holding Companies, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 957, 981 (1936). The author points out that the exploitation of operating com-
panies hurts the consumer in both direct and indirect ways. High service charges, unless
controlled by public utility commissions, could inflate operating expenses by allowing
overpayments for management services. Such overpayments could impede a rate reduc-
tion or even require a rate increase. The possibility that overpayments could drain funds
allocated for maintenance or additional services implies possible cutbacks in service for
utility users.
78. These include the marketing of new securities (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §21
(1975); mergers (§22); inter-utility agreements (§27); and transfer of franchises (§28).
79. Direct commission control over utility expenditures remains a live issue in at least
some states. See In re Promotional Practices of Pub. Util. & Coop. Util. Ass'n, 97 P.U.R.3d
1 (Okla. Commerce Comm'n 1972) (where the commission ordered the termination of
institutional advertising and charitable contributions in excess of a maximum level).
80. Section 8a(3) of the Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §8a(3) (1975),
prohibits a utility from entering into any contract agreement with an affiliated company
without the approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Every contract agreement not
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The remaining source of Commission influence over operating
expenses comes through its decisions whether to consider a par-
ticular operating expense for rate-making purposes." If an
expenditure is not considered, the utility would be forced to pay
the expenditure out of its profits. This should result in the utility
making a comparable reduction in the expenditure. However, the
utility could simply continue that particular expenditure, while
reducing other expenditures necessary to serve the public pro-
perly."
The Illinois Commerce Commission unquestionably has au-
thority to eliminate improper operating expenses from considera-
tion in a rate proceeding.83 With few exceptions, the Illinois Su-
preme Court has considered the propriety of operating expenses
to be a question of fact for the Commission, and has not articu-
lated definite standards by which to determine whether an ex-
penditure is proper .8 In the small number of cases in which the
Illinois Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review Com-
mission determinations regarding operating expenses, the court
has found certain categories of expenditures not improper per se.
These include municipal franchise payments85 and the cost of rate
consented to is expressly made "void" by the Act. The purpose of this provision is to
protect the consumer from charges resulting from transactions that are not negotiated by
independent parties, but are orchestrated by the common owner of a utility and its
affiliate.
Despite this clear authority, the Commission has never required Illinois Bell to submit
its original contract with its parent, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., to the
Commission. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill.2d 461, 481,
303 N.E.2d 364, 375 (1973). The Commission also considers payments made pursuant to
such a contract as a part of operating expenses. See In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 59666,
24 (I1. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
The Commission's failure to require approval of contracts and transactions with affili-
ated interests came to light in In re Ingram Barge Inc., No. 76-0269 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1976) (involving large payments for insurance and other arrangements between
Ingram Barge, Inc. and various affiliates of the utility's parent).
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 8a(3) (1975).
82. Comment, supra note 77, at 986.
83. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), rev'g City of Houston v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922), and Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923), on the question of whether management
fees may be disallowed in the absence of clear bad faith or proof that the services could
have been obtained more cheaply elsewhere.
84. Villages of Milford v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 20 Ill.2d 556, 170 N.E.2d 576
(1960); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E.2d 482 (1939).
85. City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas & Elec. Co., 363 Ill. 144, 1 N.E.2d 489
(1936). See also Chicago Rys. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 277 F. 970 (N.D. Ill. 1922).
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proceedings." However, in an early case, the court found that
charitable contributions were improper unless "it is shown that
they will be of some peculiar benefit to the company or its pa-
trons." 87
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion, 5 the Illinois Supreme Court lengthened the list of operat-
ing expenses that were improper per se. These included (1) pay-
ments to Illinois Bell affiliate Western Electric Company that
provided Western Electric with a profit level in excess of what
Illinois Bell was permitted to earn," (2) payments to Illinois Bell's
parent, American Telephone and Telegraph Company for expen-
ses that Illinois Bell could not properly include as operating ex-
penses itself and expenses that provided no direct benefit to Illi-
nois Bell subscribers," (3) charitable contributions,9 (4) lobbying
expenses," and (5) membership fees and dues. 3 The court upheld
86. See note 61 supra. See also Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith, 295 F. 385 (S.D. Ill.
1923).
87. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E.2d 482, 498 (1939).
This holding has been ignored by the Commission since 1959. See In re Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., No. 56831, 50-51 (Ill. Commrce Comm'n 1972), rev'd, Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973).
88. 55 Ill.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973).
89. The court's rationale for disallowing this expense is that it "imposes on Bell's
patrons the burden of providing to AT&T through the device described, an excessive
return on the sales by Western to Bell .... " Id. at 483-84, 303 N.E.2d at 376.
90. The court's rationale here was that:
[Ilt is improper to permit Bell to include in its operating expenses for rate-
making purposes a license fee to AT&T based on a percentage of revenues, and
that the amount of the payment of the license fee must be directly related to,
and include 1 only, such expenditures as would be permissible if made by Bell
.... Although not specifically identifiable in the exhibits on file, it is obvious
that AT&T incurred expenses occasioned by its holding-company activities and
relating directly to its position as an investor in Bell, and Bell's rate payers
should not be required to pay any part of this cost until it can be shown to
directly benefit them or the services which Bell renders.
Id. at 482-83, 303 N.E.2d at 375-76.
91. The court's rationale was that "the allowance of charitable contributions as operat-
ing expenses for purposes of ratemaking constitutes an involuntary assessment on the
utility's patrons, and we question the propriety of Bell's being permitted to thus dispense
largesse at their expense." Id. at 481, 303 N.E.2d at 375.
92. The court reasoned that since Bell's customers are not given an opportunity either
to advocate or decide which legislative proposals should be supported by Bell, they should
not bear the cost of Bell's lobbying. Id. at 480, 303 N.E.2d at 374.
93. The Commission noted that, despite the split of authority, it would be better to
disallow expenditures for dues to civic, social and athletic clubs. Id. at 481, 303 N.E.2d
at 375.
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the Commission's allowance of Illinois Bell's advertising94 and its
payments for gasoline that could have been purchased more inex-
pensively.5 Immediately after this Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion, Illinois Bell was able to secure enactment, by the General
Assembly, of amendments to the Public Utilities Act that nulli-
fied the court's decisions with respect to charitable contribu-
tions" and, ostensibly, with respect to payments to Western Elec-
tric. 7
Prior to this case, there was only one case that reached the Illinois Supreme Court where
a party was appealing the Commission's refusal to exclude an amount from operating
expenses. This was Villages of Milford v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 20 Ill.2d 556, 170
N.E.2d 576 (1960), where the plaintiff appealed from the Commission's refusal to treat
executives' salaries as excessive. Examining the executives' background and responsibili-
ties, the court sustained the Commission's refusal.
Still fewer decisions are found where the Commission is reversed for such failure. One
case is Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930). There, the Supreme Court went
as far as any court had gone in requiring judicial examination of an operating expense that
the Commission had refused to examine. The Court remanded to the district court, the
question of the reasonableness of expenditures for equipment paid by Illinois Bell to its
affiliated company, Western Electric. To be determined was the profit rate on these sales
to Illinois Bell and also the amount of expenditures for "service" paid by Illinois Bell to
its parent company under a 1.5% licensing agreement. Previously, the Commission had
found insufficient evidence in the record to find that the charges by Western Electric to
AT&T were unreasonable. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 3 I.C.C. 75, 94-97 (1923). See City
of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 7 Cal.3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1972); Colorado Mun. League v. Public Util. Comm'n, 473 P.2d 960 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1970).
These cases involved Commission failure to utilize accelerated depreciation. The Califor-
nia case also involved Commission failure to exclude charges by Western Electric. A prior
California Supreme Court case had approved the elimination of such charges. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal.2d 643, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
94. In the next Illinois Bell Telephone rate case, the Commission did eliminate 40% of
Illinois Bell's advertising and public relations as accomplishing no economic benefit to the
telephone customers. In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 57903-6 & 58033 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1973). However, in the most recent Illinois Bell Telephone case, the Commission
eliminated only a token amount of Illinois Bell's advertising after denying the discovery
of the Cook County State's Attorney relative to Bell's advertising and public relations
largely identical to that provided in the earlier docket. See In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No.
59666 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1976).
95. 55 Ill.2d 478-79, 484, 303 N.E.2d 364, 373-74 (1973).
96. H.B. 2864 (P.A. 78-1243) adds the following language:
[I]t shall be proper for the Commission to consider as an operating expense,
for the purpose of determining whether a rate or other charge or classification
is sufficient, donations made by a public utility for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific, religious or educational purposes, provided that such do-
nations are reasonable in amount.
97. H.B. 2861 (P.A. 78-1236) adds the following language:
[T]he Illinois Commerce Commission shall not require a public utility to make
purchases at prices exceeding the prices offered by an affiliated interest, and
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The Illinois legislature should adopt legislation that more
closely controls utility operating expenditures. Political contribu-
tions and other favors extended to candidates for office should be
prohibited. Further, all advertising and public relations promo-
tions designed to enhance the utility's image should also be pro-
hibited. In general, any expenditure or part of any expenditure
which has no economic benefit to the utility customer, which
would not be undertaken by a reasonably prudent business oper-
ating under the normal pressures of competition, or which is the
result of management decisions to influence public policy of gov-
ernment officials, should not be considered a legitimate operating
expense or charged to the consumer. Furthermore, the burden of
justifying operating expenses should be upon the utility. Adop-
tion of these proposals would go a long way towards protecting the
utility consumer from unnecessary rate increases and also would
remove one of the substantive factors in Illinois rate proceedings
that favors the utilities.
C. Costs of Service Studies
Utilities do not always allocate rate increases equally among
consumers. Quite often, after a utility receives a rate increase, the
rates for some communities may increase, remain the same, or
even decrease. There appears to be no justification for this
variance. It has occurred because the Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion does not require utilities to furnish a cost of service study
that reflects utility costs in serviced communities. Consequently,
some communities may pay utility rates higher than their propor-
tionate share of the cost.
In In re Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,"5 Illinois Bell proposed to
increase the average cost of telephone service twenty per cent. An
investigation of the impact on individual rates, however, revealed
a wide variance. Rates in some communities, or for some services,
were to increase thirty to fifty per cent. Some rates were sched-
shall not be required to disapprove or disallow, solely on the ground that such
payments yield the affiliate interests a return in excess of that allowed the
public utility, any portion of payment for purchases from an affiliated interest.
Although not eliminated by the subsequent amendments, the portion of the court deci-
sions relating to payments to AT&T has been largely ignored by the Commission. In Nos.
57903-6 & 58033, nothing was eliminated and in No. 59666, only a token amount was
eliminated.
98. No. 56831 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1972).
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uled to decrease. The witnesses for Bell could provide no rational
explanation for this variance, nor was one required under the
existing system of setting rates." Despite the statutory prohibi-
tion against discriminatory or preferential rates,' °' no require-
ment exists for the allocation of rate increases to reflect costs. The
result is that certain customers are forced to subsidize others.
A growing number of states are requiring cost of service studies
in order to eliminate this problem.' Attempts to force the Illinois
Commerce Commission to require utilities to provide a cost of
service study have failed, 02 but such efforts must continue.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The structure and dynamics of the Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion also have a tendency to operate against the interests of utility
consumers. While these factors are not as blatantly biased as the
procedural and substantive factors, they are equally as real. Basi-
cally, the problem arises from the fact that the Commission must
render decisions that balance the competing interests of the util-
ity and its customers. Further, the Commission quite often lacks
funds to do this effectively.
A. Inability to Balance Competing Interests
Under Illinois law, the Commission has the responsibility of
protecting the interests of the utility consumer.03 At the same
time, the Commission also must act as a quasi-legislative forum
99. Id.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §39 (1975).
101. In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 83296 (Cal. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); In re Idaho
Power Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 458, 478 (Idaho Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); In re Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 148, 161 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); In re New York Tel.
Co., 2 P.U.R.4th (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 163, 195-96 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1970); In re
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 192 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 99 P.U.R.3d 195 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1973). See also Landor, Public Utilities Rate
Design: The Cost Service Method of Pricing, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 36 (1974).
102. Similarly, attempts over the last several years to have the Commission restructure
Illinois gas and electric rates along the lines of the lifeline rates established in California
have failed. See Assembly Bill No. 167 (California 1975-76 session). See also Maine Pub.
Util. Comm'n, General Order 40 (1973).
103. Illini State Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 39 Il.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 769
(1968).
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to hear applications for utility rate increases.' 4 Caught in the
milieu of new rate filings, the Commission must allocate a dispro-
portionate share of its limited resources to requests by the utili-
ties.'05
In the daily operations of the Commission, it is the Commission
staff that represents the interests of the utility consumers. For
example, the Commission staff intervenes in the proceedings be-
fore the Commission hearing officers and cross-examines utility
witnesses. The staff also must scrutinize the utility's financial
and other records. However, the staff is not free to plot its own
course of investigation. It is responsive to the wishes of the com-
missioners and the hearing officer. Therefore, if either the hearing
officer or the commissioners are politically oriented, their influ-
ence can prevent the staff from pursuing a potentially valuable
course of investigation.'0
Finally, there is the additional problem of the limited role of
the staff in a rate hearing. While a staff person may testify in
favor of the Commission reaching a particular result, he does not
file briefs, motions for rehearings, or appeals from adverse Com-
mission decisions.' 7 Therefore, the staff cannot be expected to
represent consumer interests as effectively as an attorney. Even
if the staff wished to overcome these limitations by hiring an
outside attorney to represent consumer interests, permission
would have to be obtained from the attorney general,'' who
would be opposing them on any appeal.'00
104. State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
291 Il. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1920).
105. See Hamilton, A Proposed Public Utilities Act, 32 ILL. B.J. 226 (1944).
106. During the hearings in In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 56831 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1972), a Commission staff person who had uncovered information on the com-
pany's free and reduced rate telephone service to employees and pensioners was prevented
by the then-Commission chairman from pursuing his inquiry and cross-examining the
company's rate expert on the subject.
107. Section 72 limits appeals to "any person or corporation affected" by the final order.
It would be a close question whether the Commission staff fit this criteria. A particular
difficulty is evident with the wording in section 69 of who can intervene. That language
permits any "person or corporation as the Commission may allow to intervene .... " See
also language in Section 71 authorizing "any party to the action or proceeding" to apply
for a rehearing. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §72 (1975).
108. Art. 5, §15 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution makes the attorney general the legal
officer of the state. He cannot be deprived or relieved of his common law powers. American
Legion Post No. 279 v. Barrett, 371 11. 78, 20 N.E.2d 45 (1939).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §72(a) (1975) requires the attorney general to represent
the Commission and defend its orders and decisions.
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B. Absence of Financial Resources
The Commission staff lacks the resources to compete effec-
tively with the utilities. In order to gather evidence and present
expert witnesses, the staff needs money and manpower, both of
which they lack.10 In contrast, a utility the size of Illinois Bell has
eight full-time lawyers, hundreds of engineers, accountants, ap-
praisers, economists, and a billion-dollar budget."'
Unfortunately, utility consumers cannot rely upon more power-
ful institutional intervenors such as the federal government, the
State of Illinois, or the Cook County State's Attorney to represent
their interests. Each of these governmental entities has limited
resources and manpower to devote to rate proceedings. Addition-
ally, the primary interest of these governmental entities is pro-
tecting their own utility rates. Therefore, the interests of the gov-
ernment may not coincide fully with the interests of the
consumer. Governmental participation may simply be pro forma
for local political gain, with little or no serious attempt being
made to participate. An additional difficulty in relying on govern-
mental intervenors is that they too are subject to political pres-
sure.
In order to overcome these problems, the utility consumer
should have an independent advocate in proceedings before the
Commission. This could be accomplished by the establishment of
a full-time, consumer attorney position, funded by state reve-
nues. Another approach would be to award consumer intervenors
their costs for participating in rate proceedings before the Com-
mission.
V. THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER
In most cases, the utility consumer is unequipped to partici-
pate in a utility proceeding at any level. Almost all the legal
talent in the field is monopolized by the utilities, as are other
110. The Illinois Commerce Commission has 225 full-time and 7 part-time employees
to regulate over 500 public utilities, take responsibility for gas pipeline safety and oversee
thousands of motor carriers who operate in the state. During fiscal year 1973, the Commis-
sion had $2,616,000 to perform its utilities duties, $1,619,000 to perform its motor carrier
responsibilities, and $51,000 to check pipeline safety. Interview with Mrs. Roberta Moye,
acting secretary, Illinois Commerce Commission, at the Chicago office of the Illinois
Commerce Commission, June 1, 1973.
111. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., annual report (1975).
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types of experts and resources necessary in a public utilities rate
case.
A typical consumer intervenor is subject to many other factors
that frustrate its efforts. The intervenor may be a volunteer or-
ganization, relying on persons who can devote only their free time
outside of working hours in the campaign against the utility.
Equally unfortunate is the fact that the consumer intervenor may
be able to recruit only those expert witnesses who are willing to
donate their services. Also, because many of the consumer inter-
venors are volunteers, if they have an attorney involved in the
proceedings, he may be a specialist in some area other than pub-
lic utilities law. Hearings are usually during the day, and this
requires volunteers to take time off from work. In addition, the
consumer is usually unfamiliar with the operation of a utility, the
questions to ask or areas to investigate. Finally, the consumer is
at the mercy of the utility in obtaining information. Even when
there is a statutory right to subpoena evidence from the utility,
the utility may frustrate these efforts. With a statutory eleven-
month limit on the length of a proceeding, the utility has time
on its side if it wishes to stall in providing the requested informa-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The explanation for the current, one-sided nature of public
utilities law in Illinois lies in the fact that for the last sixty years,
the public utilities have had free rein before the Illinois Com-
merce Commission, the reviewing courts, and the General Assem-
bly. Where the Commerce Commission is concerned, the utilities
and the Commission have developed a close working relationship.
This relationship probably has resulted from years of association.
Additionally, a problem of cooperation may exist; a commissioner
or Commission staff person may have come from a utility and
retained his utility orientation. Finally, until recently, the con-
sumers have made few demands on the Commission." 2
The utilities also have dominated the courts. During the last
112. Note, Regulation, Competition, and Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L.
REv. 785, 786 (1974). An Illinois Commerce Commission staff person dealing with tele-
phone companies is reported to have declared that he had no use for the private intercon-
nect industry, the private competition to Illinois Bell.
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sixty years, Illinois Bell Telephone has been the most aggressive
of the utilities, and the appeals in which it has been involved have
played a disproportionate role in shaping public utility law in
Illinois. A measure of the utilities' success before the judiciary is
that in fourteen reported decisions before Illinois courts, involv-
ing the existing Public Utilities Act, prior to 1973, Illinois Bell
had never lost."' Illinois Bell has used its persistance to discour-
age resistance from the Commission. From every major unfavor-
able decision, Bell has taken an appeal, and in one case, pursued
an appeal for seventeen years."4
With respect to procedure, substance, and institutional struc-
turing, Illinois public utilities law is currently highly biased in
favor of the utilities. Focusing upon the Commerce Commission
or indeed, the courts, appears to accomplish little in the way of
reform. The Commission, as currently composed, ignores the pro-
cedural rights of the consumer and renders major utility rate
increases far in excess of legitimate needs. When one successfully
appeals to the courts in order to redress the arbitrary results of a
Commission decision, the Commission is slow to respond on re-
mand. Unless the composition of the Commission undergoes a
radical change, the only forum where meaningful public utility
reform can be obtained is the Illinois General Assembly."'
113. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 lll.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364
(1973). Reported decisions include: Sarelas v. Illinois Bell. Tel. Co., 42 Ill.App.2d 312, 192
N.E.2d 451 (1963) (tariff waiver of liability); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 4
N.E.2d 494 (1936) (state and local utility tax). The only reported case that Illinois Bell
lost in Illinois is Michael v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 226 Ill.App. 50 (1922), decided under
the provision of Section 36 of the Public Utilities Act of 1913, requiring affirmative proof
by the utility and Commission findings before a rate hike could go into effect.
114. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Agron, 319 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd,
449 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1971) (computing federal excise tax on local and state taxes ruled
proper); Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 229 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Ill. 1964),
aff'd, 339 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1965) (contract with private company to handle exclusively
Yellow Pages advertising ruled not to be an anti-trust violation).
115. They have three registered lobbyists plus backup staff in Springfield. Thus, when
a suit was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County in April 1972, challenging the author-
ity of the company or the Commission to allow free and reduced rates telephone service
to utility employees and pensioners, on May 4, 1972, Illinois Bell had Senate Bill 1557
introduced to authorize such concessions. Without going to committee, the bill passed the
Senate on May 11. On June 28, with only five days in the committee (three of which were
days that the legislature was not in session), the House passed the bill. On Sept. 1, it was
routinely signed by the governor and went into effect Oct. 1, 1972.
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